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This is about getting Trenton the hell out of the business of telling 
people how many units they’re supposed to have—some arbitrary, 
ridiculous formula that nobody could ever explain.1 
– New Jersey Governor Chris Christie, on his efforts to dismantle 
the Mount Laurel doctrine 
 
 
* William T. Comfort III Professor of Law, New York University Law School.  The 
author gratefully acknowledges the comments of Adam Gordon, staff attorney at the 
Fair Share Housing Center in New Jersey as well as the superlative research 
assistance provided by Andrew Neidhardt, NYU Class of 2014.  The usual caveat that 
the commenter does not endorse and is not responsible for the errors contained 
herein applies with special force to Adam Gordon, who disagrees with much of what 
is contained in this Essay. 
 1. Lisa Fleisher, Gov. Chris Christie Proposes Eliminating Affordable Housing 
Quotas, Fees, NJ.COM (May 13, 2010, 9:07 PM), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/ 
2010/05/gov_chris_christie_proposes_el.html. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Mount Laurel is in trouble—again.  But has there ever been a time 
when this statement has not been true?  The Mount Laurel doctrine 
seems perennially hovering on the brink of extinction.  It was 
surrounded by controversy when it was finally made effective with a 
“builder’s remedy” in 1983,2 and it barely survived its transition to 
statutory implementation in the form of the New Jersey Fair Housing 
Act in 1985.  Both Governors James McGreevey, a Democrat, and 
Chris Christie, a Republican, made open war on it.3  Governor 
Christie has gone so far as to attempt to abolish by executive order 
the Council on Affordable Housing (COAH), Mount Laurel’s 
statutorily created guardian.4  COAH itself has attempted to weaken 
the doctrine with a “growth share” definition of the “fair share” 
obligation that the New Jersey appellate division has ruled illegally 
weak.5 
Yet Mount Laurel stubbornly draws breath, albeit on life support: 
Despite the important constituencies in New Jersey that would like to 
pull the plug, there are other constituencies that stop the euthanizing 
of the doctrine.  The State Assembly, controlled by Democrats with 
leadership from New Jersey’s impoverished cities, has refused to let 
Governor Christie gut the doctrine with his own version of “growth 
share,”6 and the New Jersey state courts doggedly resist Governor 
Christie’s efforts to dismantle COAH or municipalities’ “fair share” 
obligation. 7 
It is an oddity when a legal doctrine cannot settle down to a 
comfortable middle age after thirty years of turmoil.  One might 
impatiently say about Mount Laurel what Oscar Wilde’s Lady 
 
 2. On the controversy associated with the “builder’s remedy,” see John M. 
Payne, Reconstructing the Constitutional Theory of Mount Laurel II, 3 WASH. U. 
J.L. & POL’Y 555, 563–64 (2000). 
 3. See, e.g., Alan Mallach, The Mount Laurel Doctrine and the Uncertainties of 
Social Policy in a Time of Retrenchment, 63 RUTGERS L. REV. 849, 852, 855 (2011) 
(on the opposition of James McGreevey and Chris Christie to Mount Laurel). 
 4. See Salvador Rizzo, N.J. Supreme Court Blocks Christie’s Plan to Abolish 
Affordable-Housing Agency, NJ.COM (July 10, 2013), http://www.nj.com/politics/ 
index.ssf/2013/07/nj_supreme_court_blocks_christies_plan_to_abolish_affordable-
housing_agency.html. 
 5. See In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:94 & 5:95 by the N.J. Council on Affordable 
Hous., 914 A.2d 348, 363–64 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007) [hereinafter In re 
Adoption of 5:94 & 5:95]. 
 6. See Mallach, supra note 3, at 857–58. 
 7. See, e.g., In re Plan for Abolition of Council on Affordable Hous., 70 A.3d 
559 (N.J. 2013). 
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Bracknell said about Algernon’s fictional friend Bunbury in The 
Importance of Being Earnest: “It is high time that [Mount Laurel] 
made up [its] mind whether [it] is going to live or to die.  This shilly-
shallying with the question is absurd.”8 
Why cannot Mount Laurel make up its mind whether it is going to 
live or die?  The dilemma arises from Mount Laurel’s serving a 
genuine need in a clumsy way.  On one hand, as I explain in Part I, 
the doctrine helps New Jersey’s 566 municipalities and townships 
overcome collective action problems that otherwise might excessively 
impede an adequate supply of housing.9  On the other hand, the 
specific design of the doctrine—in particular, the assignment of 
specific numbers of housing units to particular municipalities—
undermines the doctrine’s effectiveness as a device for overcoming 
these collective action problems.  As I suggest in Part II, this “unit-
based” rule—that is, a rule that assigns housing units to particular 
jurisdictions—places extraordinary informational burdens on judges 
and bureaucrats, because such a rule forces public officials to do the 
job of siting housing, a task usually reserved for housing markets 
rather than law.10  Because the data and siting criteria are so 
controversial, unit-based doctrines invite maximum homeowner 
resistance, as each suburban and rural jurisdiction vies with each 
other to skew the contestable formulae in their own favor.  Inner-ring 
suburbs, for instance, will want to emphasize “buildable land,” as a 
factor for siting affordable housing, while rural townships will want to 
encourage infill and redevelopment.  This bureaucratic and legislative 
infighting reproduce the very collective action problem that Mount 
Laurel was supposed to solve.  In this sense, Mount Laurel has 
created, in Governor Christie’s pungent phrase, “some arbitrary, 
ridiculous formula that nobody could ever explain,” because the 
Mount Laurel formula does not reassure each homeowner that they 
are being treated fairly—a major point of any “fair share” doctrine. 
In Part III, I will suggest that these informational burdens and, less 
confidently, the political controversy, might be mitigated by 
supplementing or even replacing Mount Laurel’s unit-based rule with 
a doctrine targeting zoning restrictions.11  In particular, I will suggest 
 
 8. OSCAR WILDE, THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING EARNEST 13 (Kenneth McLeish et 
al. eds., Nick Hern Books 1995) (1898). 
 9. See infra Part I. 
 10. See infra Part II. 
 11. See infra Part III. 
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that state law might impose on every municipality a minimum zoned 
residential density to eliminate excessive restriction of multi-family 
and other forms of “least-cost housing”—that is, housing that uses the 
smallest marketable amount of land and materials to construct.  The 
point of this density requirement would not be to second-guess 
housing markets by siting units in particular jurisdictions, but instead 
to create a sufficient reserve of zoning entitlements so that builders 
could decide where housing could be most profitably produced in 
response to consumer demand.  By removing regulatory barriers to 
housing supply, this revised doctrine would alleviate the problem of 
housing affordability without dictating to the market where housing 
ought to be located.  Using “anti-snob zoning” statutes in 
Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island as rough models, I will 
suggest that Mount Laurel might face less opposition if it focused less 
on fixing the precise number of units to be allocated to each 
municipality and more on forcing municipalities to justify the 
exorbitant quantities of land that they require per dwelling unit. 
I.  THE NEED FOR MOUNT LAUREL: MUNICIPAL COLLECTIVE 
ACTION PROBLEMS 
Consider, first, how “affordable housing”—meaning, for the 
purposes of this Essay, housing priced at less than the price of the 
median residential structure in the municipality where the housing is 
located—gives rise to a collective action problem.  The problem arises 
from a conflict between affordable housing’s local costs and regional 
benefits.  On the one hand, affordable housing imposes uncertain 
local fiscal, political, and social costs on municipalities that host it.  
The fiscal cost results from affordable housing’s being liable for lower 
ad valorem property taxes than the median structure, allowing the 
former’s occupants to consume the same level of services for a lower 
tax price than that paid by the occupants of median-valued housing.  
This effective redistribution of wealth from high-valued to low-valued 
property will be capitalized into the price of both, raising the price of 
the latter, lowering the price of the former, and reducing the tax 
revenue available to both for local services.12  The political cost arises 
from correlation of tastes for local public goods with income.  
Assuming that services like parks and recreation, education, and 
 
 12. Stephen M. Calabrese et al., Inefficiencies from Metropolitan Political and 
Fiscal Decentralization: Failures of Tiebout Competition, 79 REV. ECON. STUD. 1081, 
1102–04 (2012). 
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environmental enhancement are normal goods, demand should rise 
with income, leading to conflicts between different socio-economic 
groups about their local government’s spending priorities.  Economic 
heterogeneity leads to ideological heterogeneity, which, in turn, leads 
to fights that undermine the trust needed for political cooperation.13  
Finally, affordable housing can have social costs to the extent that it is 
occupied by very poor households with unstable family structures; 
both crime and low educational achievement are correlated with 
either concentrated poverty of a neighborhood or parental instability 
associated with such poverty.14 
Exclusionary zoning is a rational way for individual municipalities 
to reduce the risks of these fiscal, political, and social costs.  By 
requiring residents to purchase an identically valued structure on 
which a uniform tax rate is levied, such zoning transforms the ad 
valorem property tax into a lump-sum fee, insuring that each resident 
pays the same amount in taxes, receives the same package of services, 
and thereby reveals by their migration to the municipality that they 
value the services at the taxes charged.15  Uniformity of housing type 
promotes uniformity of income and, thus, uniformity of demands for 
social services.  The exclusion of poor households is also a heartless 
but effective way for higher-income groups to insulate themselves 
from the social costs of poverty. 
 
 13. See DAVID E. CAMPBELL, WHY WE VOTE: HOW SCHOOLS AND COMMUNITIES 
SHAPE OUR CIVIC LIFE 50–75 (2006) (describing relationship between ideological 
homogeneity and social trust); MARION ORR, BLACK SOCIAL CAPITAL: THE POLITICS 
OF SCHOOL REFORM IN BALTIMORE, 1986–1998, at 140–41 (1999) (describing how 
inter-ethnic strife distracted from Baltimore schools’ educational mission); Robert D. 
Putnam, E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-First Century, 
30 SCANDINAVIAN POL. STUD. 137, 142–43 (2007) (describing relationship between 
ideological homogeneity and social trust). 
 14. Compare Robert J. Sampson, Crime and Public Safety: Insights from 
Community-Level Perspectives on Social Capital, in SOCIAL CAPITAL AND POOR 
COMMUNITIES 89 (Susan Saegert et al. eds., 2001) (arguing that concentrated poverty 
within a neighborhood leads to higher crime and lower educational achievement), 
with Philip Orepoulos, The Long-Run Consequences of Living in a Poor 
Neighborhood, 118 Q.J. ECON. 1533 (2003) (arguing that poverty of household rather 
than neighborhood leads to crime and lower educational achievement).  On the 
effects of parental instability and single-parent households on child welfare and 
behavior problems, see Terry-Ann Craigie et al., Fragile Families and Child 
Wellbeing, 20 FUTURE OF CHILD. 87 (2010). 
 15. Bruce W. Hamilton, Zoning and Property Taxation in a System of Local 
Governments, 12 URB. STUD. 205, 207 (1975).  Calabrese, Epple and Romano suggest 
that household heterogeneity and lot-size heterogeneity will likely persist even with 
exclusionary zoning. Calabrese et al., supra note 12, at 1109. 
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The solution of exclusion, however, has regional costs that 
individual municipalities are likely to discount or ignore.  The co-
existence of households with different incomes can produce benefits 
for all income groups—jobs for poorer households, workers for richer 
municipalities, and various agglomeration benefits from denser 
housing that permits multiple employers to locate in the same 
community.16  Low-income households can avoid neighborhood 
violence and increase their income and employment by residing in a 
community with higher median household income.17  Moreover, low-
income households can gain these benefits at little cost to the 
neighbors if the number of affordable dwelling units is small.  
Consider, for instance, Ethel R. Lawrence Homes (ERLH), the 
residential development built as a result the original Mount Laurel 
litigation.  ERLH contains only 140 dwelling units,18 a tiny number 
compared to Mount Laurel Township’s 18,249 dwelling units 
reflected in the 2010 census.19  Len Albright, Elizabeth Derickson, 
and Douglas Massey found ERLH had no effect on Mount Laurel’s 
crime, property values or taxes when Mount Laurel was compared to 
 
 16. See David Schleicher, The City as a Law and Economic Subject, 2010 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 1507, 1507 on the tension between sorting households based on their 
preference for local public goods and agglomerating different sorts of firms together 
to produce beneficial interaction among them.  See id. at 1529 for a discussion of the 
tension between sorting households based on their preference for local public goods 
and agglomerating different sorts of firms together to produce beneficial interaction 
among them. 
 17. Douglas S. Massey, Lessons from Mount Laurel: The Benefits of Affordable 
Housing for All Concerned, POVERTY & RACE RES. ACTION COUNCIL (May/June 
2012), 
http://prrac.org/full_text.php?item_id=13429&newsletter_id=123&header=Current%
20Projects.  Len Albright, Elizabeth Derickson, and Douglas Massey found that the 
occupants of Ethel Lawrence Homes reaped substantial benefits from living in 
Mount Laurel in terms of higher employment, less exposure to violence, greater total 
income, and lower rates of welfare dependency when compared to similar residents 
in communities with a larger share of low-income households. Len Albright et al., Do 
Affordable Housing Projects Harm Suburban Communities? Crime, Property 
Values, and Property Taxes in Mt. Laurel, New Jersey 27–28 (June 15, 2011) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1865231. 
 18. See Ethel R. Lawrence Homes, FAIR SHARE HOUS. DEV., 
http://fairsharedevelopment.org/housing/development/ethel-lawrence/ (last visited 
Sept. 16, 2013). 
 19. Profile of General Population and Housing Characteristics, Mount Laurel 
Township, Burlington County, New Jersey, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/community_facts.xhtml#none (search 
“Mount Laurel Township, Burlington County, New Jersey”; then follow “Housing” 
hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 16, 2013). 
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a matched set of neighboring townships.20  Indeed, in a survey 
conducted by Massey and his colleagues, one-third of the neighbors 
did not even know affordable housing existed in the neighborhood, 
and, among those who did know, only forty percent could successfully 
name the project.21 
Individual municipalities will often ignore these benefits of 
affordable housing.  Each municipality does not internalize the 
benefits that their affordable housing confers on neighboring 
employers, because the employees who work for neighboring 
municipalities’ employers can take advantage of such housing even if 
those employees cross a municipal border when commuting to work.22  
A similar incentive for free-riding arises among affluent communities 
with altruistic preferences.  Even if each wealthy community wanted 
low-income households to benefit from integrated schools and 
residential markets, they would nevertheless have an incentive to 
free-ride off of neighboring communities’ efforts to provide these 
benefits.  The collective problem is exacerbated by uncertainty.  A 
small amount of affordable housing might be costless—but how small 
is small enough?  Neighbors whose largest investment consists of the 
down payment on their owner-occupied home are likely to be risk-
averse in calculating the safe number of dwelling units.23  This anxiety 
about setting the number of dwelling units too high is exacerbated by 
the collective action problems faced by individual households trying 
to anticipate whether their neighborhood’s social-economic 
composition will rapidly change because their neighbors will sell.24 
 
 20. Albright et al., supra note 17, (manuscript at 27). 
 21. Massey, supra note 17. 
 22. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, Political Structure and Exclusionary Zoning: Are 
Small Suburbs the Big Problem?, in FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND LAND POLICIES 
111, 130–31 (Gregory K. Ingram & Yu-Hung Hong eds., 2008). 
 23. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME 
VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-
USE POLICIES 8–10, 268–69 (2001). 
 24. For Thomas Schelling’s classic account of how individual households face a 
collective action problem in determining whether a neighborhood will maintain an 
ideal racial or social composition, see Thomas C. Schelling, A Process of Residential 
Segregation: Neighborhood Tipping, in RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN ECONOMIC LIFE 
157 (Anthony H. Pascal ed., 1972).  For evidence that fear of neighborhood 
unraveling continues to make stable racial integration challenging, see INGRID 
GOULD ELLEN, SHARING AMERICA’S NEIGHBORHOODS: THE PROSPECTS FOR STABLE 
RACIAL INTEGRATION (2000). 
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Each municipality is, therefore, trapped in a prisoner’s dilemma in 
which it is always rational to exclude affordable housing regardless of 
whether neighboring municipalities host such housing (in which case 
exclusive communities will reap the regional benefits without the 
attendant local risks) or exclude it (in which case exclusive 
communities will avoid being the sole site for the region’s affordable 
housing). 
II.  THE PROBLEM WITH MOUNT LAUREL: INFORMATIONAL 
BURDENS OF THE UNIT-BASED APPROACH 
Given the strategic bind in which each municipality finds itself 
when it tries to accommodate affordable housing, one might think 
that Mount Laurel would be welcomed by the suburbs as a way of 
freeing them from the risk of bearing a disproportionate share of low-
income households.  Moreover, because the effects of housing 
heterogeneity could be anticipated by homebuyers, Mount Laurel can 
perform this coordinating function with a very modest redistribution 
of wealth.  While buyers of more expensive structures could be 
expected to bid less as a result of Mount Laurel, buyers of cheaper 
structure would bid more, anticipating good services at the cost of a 
lower tax bill.25  The redistributive effect of Mount Laurel is 
dampened not only by the magic of capitalization but also by the New 
Jersey Appellate Division’s moderation in pursuit of equality, such as 
the court’s exclusion of cost-burdened households from the definition 
of “present regional need” for affordable housing.26 
Yet Mount Laurel and its implementation through the New Jersey 
Fair Housing Act have attracted apparently endless suburban anger 
 
 25. Bruce W. Hamilton, Capitalization of Intrajurisdictional Differences in Local 
Tax Prices, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 743 (1976). 
 26. The COAH’s “second round” rules excluded “cost-burdened” households—
meaning low- and moderate-income households paying more than fifty percent of 
their gross income on housing—from the definition of “present regional need,” 
thereby substantially lowering the total number of housing units that each region 
would have to supply.  Given that overcrowded housing counts as part of this 
“present need,” the exclusion of cost-burdened household might seem to be 
irrational, because a cost-burdened household could convert to an overcrowded 
household simply by spending less on rent and more on food, clothing, and 
transportation.  The Appellate Division upheld COAH’s definition, however, on the 
prudential ground that otherwise the number of affordable units required to meet 
present need would be too large. In re Adoption of 5:94 & 5:95, supra note 5, at 369 
(noting that 636,000 households were cost-burdened, requiring 260,000 new market-
rate units to be constructed per decade with twenty percent set aside as affordable 
units). 
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from the moment Chief Justice Wilentz imposed the “builder’s 
remedy” to make Mount Laurel effective.27  Why the fuss, when the 
doctrine seems to help the protesting municipalities escape from a 
collective action dilemma? 
I suggest that Mount Laurel’s effort to assign specific numbers of 
housing units to particular jurisdictions—what I call a “unit-based” 
approach to exclusionary zoning – creates problems for the doctrine.  
This unit-based approach creates two difficulties that make the 
doctrine inspire political controversy.  First, as a pragmatically 
empirical matter, the unit-based approach places heavy informational 
burdens on public officials that they cannot easily discharge to the 
satisfaction of politicians.  Second, the unit-based approach takes the 
focus off policies that municipalities fully control—the restrictiveness 
of their zoning rules—and instead concentrates on housing 
production and price, policy outcomes that are mostly the product of 
household wealth and consumer demand outside of municipal power.  
Such a refocusing on bad private economic conditions (poverty and 
high land rents from escalating private demand) naturally gives rise to 
the question: “Why are municipalities being charged with the duty of 
banishing poverty?”  It makes more sense to focus instead on the 
question, “why are municipalities exacerbating poverty with overly 
restrictive land-use rules?” 
The first complaint against unit-based approaches is familiar not 
only from statements by Mount Laurel’s critics but also those of its 
supporters.  As the late Professor John Payne observed, the formulae 
used to implement Mount Laurel “became almost impossible to 
explain succinctly to lay audiences.”28  David Kinsey essentially re-
stated Governor Christie’s criticism of Mount Laurel more 
diplomatically when Kinsey wrote that the unit-based approach (or 
what Kinsey called “the formulaic approach”) “produced confusion 
and cynicism due to its complexity and opacity, and consequently 
failed to rally the political support needed to sustain an unpopular, 
 
 27. S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390, 452–53 (N.J. 
1983).  Southern Burlington is frequently cited as Mount Laurel II. E.g., John M. 
Pyane, Politics, Exclusionary Zoning and Robert Wilentz, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 689, 
689 n.1 (1997).  On the ineffectiveness of Mount Laurel prior to the builder’s 
remedy—basically, a writ of mandamus entitling the plaintiff to a building permit—
and the suburban outrage that the builder’s remedy provoked, see DAVID L. KIRP ET 
AL., OUR TOWN: RACE, HOUSING AND THE SOUL OF SUBURBIA, 85–92, 121–27 (1995). 
 28. John M. Payne, The Paradox of Progress: Three Decades of Mount Laurel 
Doctrine, 5 J. PLAN. HIST. 126, 132 (2006). 
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judicially driven policy that interfered with local land use 
prerogatives.”29 
COAH’s initial effort to carry out a unit-based approach to Mount 
Laurel  took the form of rules implementing the New Jersey Fair 
Housing Act,30 rules largely based on the formulae devised in turn by 
the three “Mount Laurel judges” selected by Chief Justice Wilentz31—
in particular, Justice Serpentelli’s decision in AMG Realty Co. v. 
Township of Warren.32  This AMG Realty formula bases municipal 
fair shares on each municipality’s share of a region’s buildable land, 
employment, regional income, and substandard housing.33  The data 
required by this multi-factored assignment of units to places is 
enormous, including (in Kinsey’s catalogue) “journey-to-work 
patterns existing housing quality . . . housing rehabilitation, household 
income, population projections, headship rates, household formation 
projections, housing price filtering, residential conversions, housing 
demolitions, equalized nonresidential property valuation (ratables), 
and undeveloped land.”34 
Aside from this voracious appetite for disputable data, AMG 
Realty’s criteria contain contestable policy assumptions about where 
housing ought to be located, assumptions that neither the courts nor 
COAH have bothered to defend.  Why, for instance, base fair shares 
of housing on the municipality’s share of buildable land in a region?  
Demolition and vertical construction obviously allow a built-out 
municipality to increase its residential densities.  Building denser 
structures in municipalities with less land might make more sense 
than spreading out low-density developments in more rural areas.  
AMG Realty implicitly assumes without comment, however, that the 
existing low-density use of parcels can trump the need for affordable 
housing.  Low-density suburban jurisdictions like Cherry Hill, which 
contains only 1.7 dwelling units per acre, exploit this vacant land 
 
 29. David N. Kinsey, The Growth Share Approach to Mount Laurel Housing 
Obligations: Origins, Hijacking, and Future, 63 RUTGERS L. REV. 867, 869 (2011). 
 30. For COAH’s basic method for calculating municipal “fair shares” under its 
“first round” and “second round” of rules, see N. J. ADMIN. CODE 5 § 93-2.1 (2001). 
 31. The three judges and their formulae were Steven Skillman, who wrote 
Countryside Props. v. Mayor and Council of Ringwood, 500 A.2d 767, 769 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984); L. Anthony Gibson, who wrote Van Dalen v. Washington 
Twp., 500 A.2d 776, 779–80 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984); and Eugene Serpentelli, 
who wrote AMG Realty Co. v. Twp. of Warren, 504 A.2d 692, 727 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
Law Div. 1984). 
 32. AMG Realty, 504 A.2d at 727. 
 33. See generally AMG Realty, 504 A.2d 692. 
 34. Kinsey, supra note 29, at 869. 
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factor to reduce their “fair share” on the ground that their territory is 
already occupied by detached single-family homes—as if, somehow, a 
multi-family structure cannot replace an existing low-density or non-
residential building.35  By contrast, the AMG Realty formula 
originally did not directly consider each municipality’s share of the 
regional property tax base in calculating fair shares, an omission that 
seems puzzling given that Mount Laurel was expressly designed to 
counteract municipal incentives to exclude housing for fiscal 
reasons.36  (Share of regional employment, which AMG Realty does 
include in its “fair share” formula, constitutes only an imperfect proxy 
for tax base, given that some employers—non-profit universities and 
government, for instance—are tax-exempt).  Again, neither AMG 
Realty nor Mount Laurel explains this decision. 
Because the data selected as relevant by AMG Realty is so dense, 
courts and bureaucrats must rely on crude proxies, slight 
modifications of which can have dramatic effects on the number of 
affordable units that a jurisdiction is obliged to host.  Consider, for 
instance, COAH’s varying definitions of “substandard housing”: in its 
Second and Third Rounds of rules, COAH relied on different census 
proxies37 to define “substandard housing” that radically reduced the 
present need for housing from 60,281 units38 to 24,847 units.39  As one 
would expect, the appellate division largely upheld these changes 
based on deference to “COAH’s broad discretion in selecting an 
 
 35. See CHERRY HILL TWP. PLANNING BD., MASTER PLAN 2003, at 190, 202 
(2003), available at http://www.cherryhill-nj.com/DocumentCenter/Home/View/437. 
 36. The omission of tax base share was remedied in 1993. See Substantive Rules 
of The New Jersey Council on Affordable Housing for the Period Beginning June 6, 
1994, N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 5:93 (2011). 
 37. COAH’s second round rules used seven “surrogates” from the 1990 Census to 
approximate the number of deficient or dilapidated housing units, with two proxies 
indicating a deficient unit.  The seven surrogates were (1) units built prior to 1940; (2) 
overcrowded units, that is, units having 1.01 or more persons per room; (3) 
inadequate plumbing; (4) inadequate kitchen facilities; (5) inadequate heating fuel, 
that is, no fuel at all or using coal or wood; (6) inadequate sewer services; and (7) 
inadequate water supply. N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 5:93 app. A, at 93-50.  COAH’s Third 
Round rules, however, used only three surrogates for dilapidated housing, consisting 
of (1) overcrowded units built prior to 1940; (2) units lacking adequate plumbing 
facilities; and (3) units lacking adequate kitchen facilities.  Likewise, the Third Round 
rules reduced certain towns’ obligation by subtracting numbers for “spontaneous 
rehabilitation” of housing from those towns’ numbers. N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 5:94 app. 
a, at 94-33. 
 38. N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 5:93 app. a, at 93-52. 
 39. N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 5:94 app. a, tbl.4, at 94-36. 
HILLS_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 11/12/2013  11:16 PM 
1622 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XL 
appropriate methodology.”40  Such broad discretion is unavoidable 
when the informational demands of the doctrine dwarf the capacity of 
a court to evaluate or find alternative data to those which the agency 
selects. 
Efforts to simplify the unit-based approach have failed, because the 
problems with the approach are endemic to the challenge of assigning 
housing to particular jurisdictions.  Recognizing that the complexity 
of unit-based formulae endangered Mount Laurel’s legitimacy and 
predictability, some of Mount Laurel’s supporters initially pressed in 
the 1990s for some version of “growth share” by which to assign units 
to jurisdictions.41  The general idea of “growth share” is that 
municipalities should require some number of affordable units to be 
built in some fixed ratio to new market-rate housing units or new 
commercial square footage.42  The most frequently used ratio, for 
instance, would require twenty percent of all new market-rate 
housing or one affordable unit for every 2000 square feet of new 
nonresidential space to be set aside for low- and moderate-income 
housing.43 
Growth share is allegedly an improvement on AMG Realty, 
because it seems to give municipalities the option not to build any 
affordable housing if they decide not to issue any new building 
permits, thereby placating environmentalists dismayed at the 
countryside’s being eaten up by Mount Laurel obligations.44  At the 
same time—and contradictorily—advocates of affordable housing 
believed that properly designed growth share ratios would not induce 
municipalities simply to ban all growth as a way to exclude affordable 
housing, because it is in their interest to “accommodate some growth 
or redevelopment” given that “local governments in New Jersey are 
heavily dependent on property tax ratables.”45 
Growth share, therefore, involves the same empirically intractable 
balancing of rival values as AMG Realty.  Growth share ratios 
require a subtle balancing of municipal incentives for tax revenues 
and developers’ incentives for market-based units against the costs 
 
 40. See In re Adoption of 5:94 & 5:95, supra note 5, at 371. 
 41. John Payne was an early supporter of growth share. See, e.g., John M. Payne, 
Remedies For Affordable Housing: From Fair Share To Growth Share, 49 LAND USE 
& ZONING DIG. 6, 3–9 (1997). 
 42. Id. 
 43. See Payne, supra note 28, at 136; see also Kinsey, supra note 29, at 871. 
 44. See, e.g., Andrew Jacobs, New Jersey’s Housing Law Works Too Well, Some 
Say, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3 2001, at A1. 
 45. Payne, supra note 28, at 139. 
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(perceived and real) of affordable units for both developers asked to 
build them and municipalities asked to host them.  If the shares of 
affordable units are set too high, then developers might build nothing, 
leaving low- and moderate-income households worse off, because 
new market-rate units contribute to the downward filtering of existing 
housing to less wealthy occupants.46  Likewise, municipalities might 
calculate that the tax revenues generated by market-rate residential 
units are not sufficient to cover the costs of services to the affordable 
units, inducing them to favor commercial over residential 
development and thereby also reducing the downward filtering of 
existing housing.47  The Appellate Division has recognized that 
growth share is a covertly exclusionary device unless the ratios of 
market-rate to affordable growth actually encourage sufficient 
market-rate growth with density bonuses.48  If the density bonuses 
 
 46. Robert C. Ellickson, The Irony of “Inclusionary” Zoning, 54 S. CAL. L REV. 
1167 (1981) argues that inclusionary requirements can actually be exclusionary 
devices, to the extent that developers do not gain extra development rights from 
inclusionary units sufficient to cover those units’ costs, because the units constructed 
as a result of the inclusionary requirement might be more than offset by the units lost 
as a result of reduced filtering.  Ellickson’s argument against inclusionary zoning has 
attracted a lot of criticism. See, e.g., Andrew G. Dietderich, An Egalitarian’s Market: 
The Economics of Inclusionary Zoning Reclaimed, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 23 (1996); 
Laura M. Padilla, Reflections on Inclusionary Housing and a Renewed Look at Its 
Viability, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 539 (1995); Barbara Ehrlich Kautz, Comment, In 
Defense of Inclusionary Zoning: Successfully Creating Affordable Housing, 36 U.S.F. 
L. REV. 971 (2002).  For a defense of Ellickson’s argument and response to critics, see 
Benjamin Powell & Edward Stringham, “The Economics of Inclusionary Zoning 
Reclaimed”: How Effective Are Price Controls?, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 471 (2005).  
As Powell and Stringham note, there is wide consensus in the economic literature 
that used and new housing compete with each other to some extent in most housing 
markets, such that the latter cause the former to filter downwards at some varying 
rate, depending on the structure of local housing demand. See, e.g., Richard Green, 
Metropolitan-Specific Estimates of the Price Elasticity of Supply of Housing, and 
Their Sources, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 2, 336 (2005). 
 47. For an example of a fiscal impact analysis recommending precisely such a 
choice of commercial over residential development to fund Mount Laurel units, see 
PETER G. STECK, FISCAL IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT LOTS 2 
& 3 IN BLOCK 2802, GRAND AVENUE WEST, MERCEDES DRIVE & PHILLIPS PKWY AND 
FOR MT. LAUREL HOUSING, LOTS 3 & 5 IN BLOCK 1002, SUMMIT AVENUE, BOROUGH 
OF MONTVALE (2013), available at 
http://www.montvale.org/files/MontvaleHekFiscal6.pdf. 
 48. In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96 & 5:97, by the N.J. Council On Affordable 
Hous., 6 A.3d 445, 461 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) [hereinafter In re Adoption 
of 5:96 & 5:97]  (“Permitting municipalities to demand that developers build 
affordable housing without any additional incentives provides municipalities with an 
effective tool to exclude the poor by combining an affordable housing requirement 
with large-lot zoning . . . . A regulatory regime that relies on developers to incur the 
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become too large, however, then they risk inspiring a popular 
backlash against Mount Laurel by local lovers of open space objecting 
to the development of neighboring countryside by thousands of 
market-rate units required to finance relatively small number of 
affordable units.49  Rigid growth share ratios that do not adjust with 
downturns in the real estate market can operate as de facto bans on 
new housing.50  Yet such flexible adjustment of the ratios would not 
likely be forthcoming from slow-moving bureaucratic or political 
actors, some of whom might be all too happy to exclude all new 
housing with an apparently generous growth share ratio. 
Apart from these intractable empirical problems, there is a 
normative or conceptual difficulty with growth share: Like any other 
unit-based approach to exclusionary zoning, growth share offers a 
formula for siting affordable housing without much normative 
explanation to justify its siting criteria.  Why exactly should growing 
communities be more responsible for promoting affordable housing 
than communities with stable population?  Whether viewed from the 
perspective of households’ needs, housing’s cost, or municipalities’ 
culpability, there is no intuitively obvious reason why municipalities 
with a growing population should have such a special obligation to 
promote affordable housing.  It is not obvious, for instance, that low- 
and moderate-income households especially want to live in growing 
municipalities.  Moreover, the cost of acquiring land for affordable 
housing is likely to be higher in high-growth areas.  Likewise, growing 
municipalities have not necessarily thrown up more impediments to 
affordable housing than municipalities that issue no new building 
permits.  What, then, is the normative basis for growth share? 
The New Jersey Supreme Court has never provided a convincing 
answer to that question.  The Court has upheld municipalities’ 
imposing development fees on new non-residential development to 
fund affordable housing on the theory that new employers attract 
 
uncompensated expense of providing affordable housing is unlikely to result in 
municipal zoning ordinances that make it realistically probable that the statewide 
need for affordable housing can be met.”). 
 49. See John M. Payne, Lawyers, Judges, and the Public Interest, 96 MICH. L. 
REV. 1685, 1693–97 (1998) (describing controversy over Cranbury Township being 
required to host more than 4000 units, only 2444 of which were affordable units, 
when the township’s original population was less than 2000 occupying only 750 
dwelling units). 
 50. See Christopher Swope, Little House in the Suburbs, GOVERNING MAG., Apr. 
2000, http://www.governing.com/templates/gov_print_article?id=105880063. 
(describing dependence of inclusionary zoning on demand for market-rate units). 
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employees who bid up the price of housing, creating a special need 
for affordable housing.51  There is some rough justice to such 
“linkage” of housing obligations to employment.  But why require 
developers of new market-rate housing to bear the burden of 
affordable housing?  The New Jersey Supreme Court relied on the 
notion that “private developers . . . possess, enjoy, and consume land, 
which constitutes the primary resource for housing,” thereby 
increasing the costs of building affordable housing.52  This theory that 
new market-rate housing increases the cost of affordable housing, 
however, confuses cause and effect: if new housing is not built to 
accommodate demand, then those new buyers will likely bid up the 
cost of existing housing.  To the extent that market-rate units absorb 
housing demand that might otherwise buy up existing units, new 
developments reduce rather than increase the need for lower-income 
development.53 
The justification for charging developers of new market-rate 
housing with the cost of affordable housing is less a matter of 
distributive justice than political economy.  It is simply more 
politically palatable for existing residents to saddle non-resident 
homebuyers or owners of vacant land with the cost of redistributing 
wealth to low- and moderate-income households.  Developers who 
 
 51. Holmdel Builders Ass’n v. Twp. of Holmdel, 583 A.2d 277, 288 (N.J. 1990) 
(“[T]here is a reasonable relationship between unrestrained nonresidential 
development and the need for affordable residential development.  We do not equate 
such a reasonable relationship with the strict rational-nexus standard that demands a 
but-for causal connection or direct consequential relationship between the private 
activity that gives rise to the exaction and the public activity to which it is applied.  
Rather, the relationship is to be founded on the actual, albeit indirect and general, 
impact that such nonresidential development has on both the need for lower-income 
residential development and on the opportunity and capacity of municipalities to 
meet that need.”). 
 52. Id. 
 53. There is a plausible argument that new residential development might 
increase housing demand if the occupants of the new development enhance demand 
for neighboring lots more than the occupants of existing housing—say, by being 
wealthier, more fashionable, or louder “squeaky wheels” with local politicians.  The 
theory that new luxury housing in low-income urban neighborhoods leads to 
gentrification rests on the idea that demand for housing will increase if new and 
wealthier neighbors arrive. See generally, Veronica Guerrieri et al., Endogenous 
Gentrification and Housing Price Dynamics (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 16237, 2010), available at http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/erik. 
hurst/research/gentrification_may25_2010_circulate.pdf.  Such a theory, however, 
does not fit the facts of new migrants’ occupying new developments in the suburbs, 
because the new migrants typically are not notably more wealthy the existing 
residents and do not increase the desirability of the suburban neighborhood. 
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bear the cost of affordable housing can either pass that cost forward 
to new homebuyers (if land within the jurisdiction is non-fungible and 
demand, cost-inelastic) or backwards to the owners of vacant land (if 
the land is fungible such that newcomers will not pay the extra cost).  
Neither constituency is likely to be powerful in local politics—the 
first, because they largely consist of non-residents, the second, 
because they are likely to be isolated minorities in jurisdictions with 
substantial numbers of homeowners.54  In this sense, Holmdel might 
be correct in asserting that the development of new market-rate 
housing could sometimes create “the opportunity and capacity of 
municipalities to meet that need [for affordable housing]”55: charging 
new housing with the cost of affordable housing is a politically 
feasible way to redistribute wealth, while the outright taxation of 
local residents for the same purpose would not be politically feasible. 
Market-rate housing’s capacity to finance affordable units, 
however, depends on the cost-inelasticity of demand for the former: If 
it turns out that demand is soft, then developers will likely build fewer 
units anticipating that buyers will refuse to cover the costs of fees or 
in-kind dedications for affordable housing.  Requiring new housing to 
pay for affordable units, in short, is a hazardous undertaking that 
requires a careful estimate of housing demand.  The appellate 
division recognized as much when it struck down COAH rules that 
did not limit the discretion of municipalities to require developers to 
pay for affordable housing, holding that such inclusionary 
requirements could be effectively exclusionary if the municipality did 
not create sufficient zoning incentives for developers to bear the costs 
of the affordable units.56 
 
 54. For an account of the demographic changes from farmer-dominated politics to 
homeowner-dominated politics that lead to downzoning of land, see Adesoji O. 
Adelaja & Paul D. Gottlieb, The Political Economy of Downzoning, 38 AGRIC. & 
RESOURCE ECON. REV. 181, 194 (2009).  On the political dominance of owners of 
developed land in the zoning process, see Christian A.L. Hilber & Frédéric Robert-
Nicoud, On the Origins of Land Use Regulations: Theory and Evidence from US 
Metro Areas, 75 J. URB. ECON. 29 (2013). 
 55.  Holmdel Builders Ass’n,, 583 A.2d 277 at 288. 
 56. In re Adoption of 5:96 & 5:97, supra note 48, at 461 (“Permitting 
municipalities to demand that developers build affordable housing without any 
additional incentives provides municipalities with an effective tool to exclude the 
poor by combining an affordable housing requirement with large-lot zoning . . . . A 
regulatory regime that relies on developers to incur the uncompensated expense of 
providing affordable housing is unlikely to result in municipal zoning ordinances that 
make it realistically probable that the statewide need for affordable housing can be 
met.”). 
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Growth share theories, in sum, do not avoid the empirical 
difficulties of other unit-based attacks on exclusionary zoning.  
Instead, these theories conceal such difficulties with apparently 
simple ratios that disguise the tough choices and possibly harmful 
consequences.  It is not likely that judges and bureaucrats can easily 
determine the “sweet spot” where mandates to create affordable 
housing are not too expensive to avoid deterring market-rate 
construction but also not so cheap that developers create affordable 
housing insufficient to meet the regional need.  Proponents of growth 
share approaches to Mount Laurel have complained that COAH’s 
version of growth share hijacked the idea for the goal of merely 
reducing municipal obligations to promote affordable housing using 
“manipulated data and tortured explanations.”57  This complaint is 
accurate, but it is equally accurate to say that growth share lends itself 
to being hijacked, because the task of calculating the proper ratios by 
which to match affordable housing with growth is beyond the capacity 
of courts to gauge. 
The problem is not with growth share theories in particular but 
rather with any unit-based approach in general.  The basic difficulty 
with all such theories is that they attempt to assign to judges and 
bureaucrats the task of siting units in particular jurisdictions, a 
function normally left to housing markets.  Such a task requires 
enormous amounts of information that courts and agencies cannot 
easily collect or assess.  As AMG Realty illustrates, judges are forced 
to invent crude proxies for the nuanced considerations that influence 
markets in assigning housing to places, proxies that are far from a 
finely tuned balance of the innumerable factors—distance to work, 
distance from friends and family, price, quality of policing and 
schools, congestion and crowding, infrastructure and amenities, 
availability of social support, and so forth—that guide housing 
markets.  Unit-based formulae, therefore, will always appear to have 
a crude and bureaucratic rigidity—”some arbitrary, ridiculous 
formula that nobody could ever explain,”58 as Governor Christie 
complained. 
 
 57. Brief for Petitioner at 2, In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:94 & 5:95 by the N.J. 
Council on Affordable Hous., 914 A.2d 348 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007) (No. 
A1960-04-T3). 
 58. Fleisher, supra note 1. 
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III.  A SOLUTION TO MOUNT LAUREL’S PROBLEMS?  FOCUS ON 
ZONING RESTRICTIONS 
There is an alternative to unit-based approaches to exclusionary 
zoning: rather than focus on the regional need for affordable housing, 
the courts could instead focus on the municipal need for zoning 
restrictions.  More precisely, the courts could demand a more 
substantial justification for the extraordinary restrictions that 
municipal zoning imposes on residential uses. 
There are remedial, normative, and informational advantages to 
focusing on zoning restrictions rather than creating affordable 
housing.  As a remedial matter, zoning restrictions are fully within 
municipal control, whereas housing rents are not: municipalities have 
the power to fix the excessive restrictiveness of their zoning laws, 
whereas they are not well-suited for redistributing wealth or financing 
housing subsidies.  As a normative matter, the focus on zoning 
restrictions goes to the basis for municipal liability: municipalities 
create neither poverty nor the housing demand that leads to 
escalating rents, but municipalities do restrict housing supply with 
excessive zoning.  Finally, as an informational matter, it is much 
simpler to fix a presumptive minimum zoned density for 
municipalities than to regulate housing markets to match supply with 
demand. 
But would a restriction-based rule mitigate the political blowback 
confronted by Mount Laurel’s unit-based strategy?  This is a harder 
question, because, as explained below, minimum densities might well 
face as much or even more popular hostility than “fair share” 
formulae.  There are, however, some reasons, albeit uncertain and 
here tentatively suggested, to believe that a restriction-based strategy 
might have some political advantages over the unit-based strategy.  In 
any case, a combination of both might, if politically manageable, be 
ideal. 
A. The Proposal: A Presumptive Ceiling on Zoning 
Restrictiveness 
How might a focus on zoning restrictiveness change the character 
of Mount Laurel?  One simple approach would be to suspend 
deference to municipal zoning restrictions whenever municipal zoning 
exceeds a stipulated level of restrictiveness.  Such a ceiling would not 
be imposed on each lot within a municipality’s territory but instead 
define an overall “zoning budget” that the municipality could allocate 
freely over different parcels, allowing municipalities to severely 
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restrict the use or density of some parcels just so long as the sum of all 
such restrictions within the jurisdiction did not exceed the stipulated 
regulatory level defined by the ceiling.59 
This ceiling could be defined either as a required minimum 
percentage of favored multi-family residential uses, expressed as a 
percentage of dwelling units in multi-family structures, or as a 
required minimum level of residential density, expressed as dwelling 
units per acre.  As an example of a minimum percentage requirement, 
state law could presume that municipal zoning laws should 
accommodate the same percentage of multi-family structures within 
the municipality as the statewide percentage of housing units within 
multifamily structures.  In New Jersey, thirty-six percent of all 
housing units consist of units in structures containing two or more 
dwelling units.60  Using this figure as a ceiling on restrictiveness, local 
zoning laws would have to allow thirty-six percent of the housing 
within the municipality to consist of units in multi-family structures.  
Alternatively, the law could define the ceiling in terms of an overall 
residential density, requiring that municipal zoning laws allow a 
minimum level of gross residential zoned density necessary to insure 
that, in a jurisdiction of average housing demand, low- and moderate-
income households could afford to rent or buy housing. 
Consider the following illustration of how such a minimum zoned 
density requirement might operate.  “Ruralville” is a small township 
containing five square miles or 3200 acres of land.  The relevant state 
agency decrees that, in order to avoid excessive restriction of housing 
opportunity for all income levels, the zoning ordinance of all 
municipalities should presumptively permit four dwelling units per 
acre, including all land within the municipality however zoned or used 
as part of the denominator except those lands outside municipal 
control because of state environmental law.61  Ruralville’s zoning law, 
 
 59. For a discussion of “zoning budgets” in general, see Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & 
David N. Schleicher, Balancing the “Zoning Budget”, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 81 
(2011). 
 60. Census of Housing, Historical Census of Housing Tables—Units in Structure, 
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/census/historic/ 
units.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2013). 
 61. For an account of the complexities of measuring residential densities, see ANN 
FORSYTH, MEASURING DENSITY: WORKING DEFINITIONS FOR RESIDENTIAL DENSITY 
AND BUILDING INTENSITY (2003), available at http://www.corridordevelopment.org/ 
pdfs/from_MDC_Website/db9.pdf; Vicky Cheng, Understanding Density and High 
Density, in DESIGNING HIGH-DENSITY CITIES: FOR SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
HILLS_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 11/12/2013  11:16 PM 
1630 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XL 
therefore, would presumptively have to allow 12,800 dwelling units to 
be built unless the town could reduce its denominator by pointing to 
land such as the Pine Barrens that were unbuildable under state law.  
The town, however, could allocate these zoned units over different 
parcels any way that it pleased—for instance, setting aside seventy-
five percent of its land for single-family detached houses on one-acre 
lots (thereby accommodating 2400 units of housing) while zoning only 
ten percent of its land (320 acres) for higher-density apartments at 
thirty-two dwelling units per acre.  These zoned densities would not 
have to result in actual construction, and Ruralville, if it liked, could 
zone land for multi-family structures cumulatively for commercial or 
industrial uses as well.  Construction of structures on such 
cumulatively zoned lots would depend on the relative market for 
commercial, industrial, or residential uses.62 
To provide for some fine-tuning of the densities imposed by state 
law, the density could be treated as a rebuttable presumption rather 
than an absolute minimum.  If Ruralville’s zoning did not meet the 
state’s zoned density benchmarks, the developers seeking to build 
housing at densities at or greater than four dwelling units per acre 
could seek a builder’s remedy—a writ of mandamus—to build such 
housing on any parcel within Ruralville.  Ruralville could rebut the 
presumption that such housing should be accommodated by 
suggesting an alternative lot, either within Ruralville itself or in 
another jurisdiction.  In the latter case, Ruralville would be obliged to 
join the other potential host jurisdiction as a co-defendant and bear 
the burden of proving that that jurisdiction was a superior location for 
the proposed housing.  For instance, Ruralville could invoke the lack 
of sewer and water lines at the site chosen by the plaintiff-developer 
to rebut the presumption that the site should accommodate the 
proposed residential use, but then Ruralville would have to prove by 
the preponderance of the evidence that existing sewer and water lines 
should not extended to the proposed site.  If the utility service area 
was located in a neighboring jurisdiction—call it 
“Infrastructureville”—then Infrastructureville could be expected to 
use its expert and attorney resources to defeat Ruralville’s case 
 
SUSTAINABILITY 1, 4 (Edward Ng ed., 2012), available at http://arhitectura2tm.files. 
wordpress.com/2012/09/understanding-density-and-high-density.pdf. 
 62. Lest one think that cumulative zones are anomalous, it bears mention that 
cumulative zoning was the norm up through the 1950s.  For the case against non-
cumulative industrial zones, see Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher, The Steep 
Costs of Using Noncumulative Zoning to Preserve Land for Urban Manufacturing, 
77 U. CHI. L. REV. 249 (2010). 
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against extension, making an alliance with the plaintiff-developer.  In 
this way, the presumption would enlist developed jurisdictions to 
promote densities in suburban areas and vice versa. 
In suspending the deference that municipalities normally receive 
for their zoning laws, the ceiling proposed here resembles the “anti-
snob land use laws” of Massachusetts,63 Connecticut,64 and Rhode 
Island.65  All three of these statutes have the character of suspending 
deference for zoning exclusions when less than ten percent of the 
housing stock within the local government’s jurisdiction meets 
affordability criteria satisfied by the proposed development.66  Unlike 
these state laws, however, the ceiling here proposed would not 
require that the proposed development charge “affordable” prices, 
nor would the safe harbor for municipalities be defined in terms of 
the affordability of housing within the municipality.  Instead, the 
focus would be exclusively on the restrictiveness of the zoning, 
suspending deference for zoning laws that exceed a state ceiling on 
regulatory severity.  In this sense, the proposed ceiling would be 
focused on what the Mount Laurel decisions call “least-cost 
housing”67—that is, housing that can be constructed at the lowest 
possible cost but, based on potential market demand, rented for more 
than low- and moderate-income households could afford to pay.68 
Unlike unit-based approaches to exclusionary zoning, such a ceiling 
on zoning’s overall restrictiveness is practically easy to implement.  
The data necessary to measure gross residential densities—that is, the 
number of dwelling units within a particular geographic area minus 
land outside municipal control—is readily available from the 
Census.69  Likewise, the size of the municipal zoning “envelope”—
 
 63. Massachusetts Comprehensive Permit Act, MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 40B, §§ 20–
23 (LexisNexis 2006). 
 64. Affordable Housing Land Use Appeals Act of 1990, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-
30g (West 2010). 
 65. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-24-46.1 (2009). 
 66. For an overview of anti-snob land use laws, see Spencer M. Cowan, Anti-Snob 
Land Use Laws, Suburban Exclusion, and Housing Opportunity, 28 J. URB. AFFAIRS 
295 (2006). 
 67.  Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Twp. of Madison, 371 A.2d 1192, 1206–08 (N.J. 
1977). 
 68. See id. (explaining the meaning of “least-cost housing”). 
 69. For simple step-by-step instructions on calculating gross residential densities, 
see JULIE CAMPOLI & ALEX MACLEAN, LINCOLN INST. OF LAND POLICY, 
VISUALIZING DENSITY WORKSHOP: STEPS FOR USING THE CENSUS 2000 TO MEASURE 
HILLS_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 11/12/2013  11:16 PM 
1632 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XL 
that is, the maximum number of dwelling units that can be built on a 
particular lot consistent with the relevant zoning law—can be 
calculated with GIS software.70  The simplicity of the data required by 
such a ceiling on zoning restrictiveness is a consequence of the 
modesty of the ceiling’s mission.  Unlike unit-based approaches, the 
point of the ceiling on zoning restrictiveness would not be to 
guarantee that any particular amount of multi-family housing actually 
would be constructed or that any level of residential density actually 
would be achieved: the purpose of the ceiling, instead, would only be 
the elimination of zoning barriers to housing.  The actual construction 
of the housing would depend on the market demand for the uses that 
zoning allows but does not require. 
Despite the proposed ceiling’s apparent modesty, the elimination 
of low-density zoning could have dramatic effects on the price of all 
housing.  Limiting zoning restrictions can enlarge the quantity of 
affordable housing even when the new developments prohibited by 
the restrictions are not themselves affordable.  Occupants of older 
and cheaper housing can move into the new “least-cost” units, 
thereby creating housing opportunities at the bottom of the housing 
market when they vacate older and cheaper housing.  As Quigley and 
Raphael note, “the supply of bottom-quality housing is dependent on 
new housing construction at all levels, not just newly built ‘affordable 
housing.’”71  Measuring the precise magnitude of the deregulatory 
effect is difficult, in part because there is no standard index of zoning 
restrictiveness that allows inter-jurisdictional comparisons of 
 
DENSITY (UNITS PER ACRE), available at http://www.lincolninst.edu/subcenters/ 
visualizing-density/census.pdf. 
 70. N.J. DEP’T OF TRANSP., ROUTE 1 REGIONAL GROWTH STRATEGY: FINAL 
REPORT 22 (2010), available at http://policy.rutgers.edu/vtc/rgs/Final%20Report 
%20Sept%2021%202010.pdf (describing use of GIS software to calculate “zoning 
build-out” defined as “the theoretical maximum amount and type of new 
development that would occur if development occurred on all developable land 
according to its municipal zoning”).  For an example of such calculations in New 
Jersey’s Monmouth and Somerset Counties, see JOHN HASSE, ET AL., EVIDENCE OF 
PERSISTENT EXCLUSIONARY EFFECTS OF LAND USE POLICY WITHIN HISTORIC AND 
PROJECTED DEVELOPMENT PATTERNS IN NEW JERSEY: A CASE STUDY OF 
MONMOUTH AND SOMERSET COUNTIES (2011). 
 71. John M. Quigley & Stephen Raphael, Is Housing Unaffordable? Why Isn’t It 
More Affordable?, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 191, 205 (2008) (“[T]o the extent that cities 
make it difficult to build new housing, any type of new housing, the availability of 
low-cost housing will be reduced and the affordability of all housing will decline.”). 
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restrictions’ effects on prices.72  The most recent and sophisticated 
measures of regulatory restrictiveness indicate that the effect of 
excessive regulation on the cost of housing is substantial.73 
New Jersey, in particular, is afflicted with regulations that require 
large amounts of land per dwelling unit, effectively foreclosing multi-
family housing from much of the fastest growing parts of the state.  In 
the Route 1 area of New Jersey, for instance, sixty-two percent of the 
residentially available land is zoned for densities of acre per dwelling 
unit or higher, while eighty percent of such land is zoned at densities 
of two dwelling units or less per acre.74  Given that multi-family 
structures rarely provide a half-acre of land for each dwelling unit 
contained within the structure, eighty percent of the most densely 
populated and economically active territory within New Jersey is 
likely off-limits to a type of housing occupied by a third of New 
Jersey’s residents.  Even relatively developed suburbs like Cherry Hill 
have extraordinarily low gross densities of 1.7 dwelling units per 
acre.75  A glance at Cherry Hill’s zoning map and measure of 
residential density suggests the degree to which multi-family housing 
has a tiny share of the jurisdiction’s land, surrounded by a sea of 
single-family detached housing.76  In Monmouth County, only three 
 
 72. John M. Quigley & Larry A. Rosenthal, The Effects of Land-Use Regulation 
on the Price of Housing: What Do We Know? What Can We Learn?, 8 J. POL’Y. 
DEV. RES. 69, 100 (2005). 
 73. A survey of over 2000 jurisdictions sponsored by the Wharton Business 
School’s Zell/Lurie Real Estate Center provided a cross-jurisdiction dataset of 
regulatory restrictiveness allowing inter-jurisdictional comparisons. See Joseph 
Gyourko et al., A New Measure of the Local Regulatory Environment for Housing 
Markets: The Wharton Residential Land Use Regulatory Index, 45 URB. STUD. 693 
(2008).  Using this dataset, Theo Eicher found price effects of up to $200,000 per 
dwelling unit resulting from land-use restrictions. See Theo Eicher, Housing Prices 
and Land Use Regulations: A Study of 250 Major US Cities (May 2, 2008) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); see also Elizabeth Rhodes, UW 
Study: Rules Add $200,000 to Seattle House Price, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 14, 2008, 
http://seattletimes.com/html/businesstechnology/2004181704_eicher14.html 
(describing Professor Eicher’s analysis).  Other measures of regulatory restrictiveness 
have found substantial price effects associated with regulatory restrictiveness. See, 
e.g., Edward Glaeser et al., Why Is Manhattan so Expensive? Regulation and the 
Rise in Housing Prices, 48 J. L. & ECON. 331 (2005); Edward L. Glaeser & Bryce A. 
Ward, The Causes and Consequences of Land Use Regulations: Evidence from 
Greater Boston, 65 J. URB. ECON. 265 (2009). 
 74. N.J. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 70, at 22. 
 75. CHERRY HILL TWP. PLANNING BD., supra note 35, at 190. 
 76. DAVID J. BENEDETTI, TWP. OF CHERRY HILL DEP’T OF CMTY. DEV., ZONING 
MAP 2007 (2007), available at http://nj-cherryhill.civicplus.com/DocumentCenter/ 
View/1754. 
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percent of the remaining undeveloped land is zoned for densities of 
more than two dwelling units per acre, meaning that ninety-seven 
percent of the land precludes apartment or townhouse development.  
Eighty percent of the land is zoned for fewer than one dwelling unit 
per acre.77 
In sum, one can imagine a deregulatory Mount Laurel doctrine, 
one that would demand a more substantial justification for the 
draconian municipal restrictions on residential uses.  Such an 
approach could either supplement or replace Mount Laurel’s unit-
based assessments of housing need. 
B. Comparing Mount Laurel’s Fair Shares to a Ceiling on 
Zoning Restrictiveness 
How does such a restriction-based approach to exclusionary zoning 
stack up, either as a matter of policy, politics, or law, when compared 
to Mount Laurel’s efforts to assess the regional need for affordable 
housing? 
Consider, first, the comparative policy merits of these two methods 
for fighting exclusion.  As Part II argued above, the chief difficulty 
with Mount Laurel, as a matter of policy, is that it makes excessive 
informational and conceptual demands on judges and bureaucrats.  
Public officials cannot calculate “fair share” obligations that capture 
the true need for housing.  They are, therefore, forced to rely on 
crude proxies, the choice among which is essentially arbitrary.  Such 
proxies leave the public perplexed and give local officials strong 
incentives to game the formulae to favor their own municipalities, 
reproducing the very collective action problem that Mount Laurel 
was intended to solve.  Because of these political incentives, the 
proxies that actually end up defining “fair shares” tend to 
systematically understate the need for affordable housing.  Mount 
Laurel, for instance, admittedly undercounts housing needs by 
excluding cost-burdened households from its definition of 
substandard housing.  Likewise, in calculating “present need,” both 
AMG Realty and COAH’s rules also ignore the plight of persons in 
structurally sound households but living in neighborhoods plagued by 
high unemployment, high crime, and poor schools.  These are merely 
two examples of ways in which the unit-based formulae of Mount 
Laurel are poor benchmarks for whether local zoning laws are 
 
 77. For examples of such calculations in New Jersey’s Monmouth and Somerset 
Counties, see JOHN HASSE ET AL., supra note 70, at 18. 
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excessively restrictive.  As Part II notes, the catalogue of AMG 
Realty’s flaws could be extended indefinitely.  Moreover, the under-
counting of “fair share” formulae extends to any unit-based system 
for assigning specific types of housing to particular jurisdictions.  The 
informational demands of such systems are so great that the 
assessments of how many units are needed will generally be 
inaccurate, and the political competition for suburban votes will 
insure that the numbers always come in on the low side. 
If Mount Laurel simply endorsed the unit-based strategy of “fair 
shares” as merely one tool with which to fight exclusionary zoning, 
then these flaws would be pardonable: better low numbers than no 
numbers, one might reasonably argue.  Such low “fair shares” could 
always be supplemented by the libertarian strategy of trimming back 
on excessive regulation and thereby opening up the spigots of 
downward filtering of existing housing.  Mount Laurel, however, did 
not embrace the unit-based strategy in such a partial way: Chief 
Justice Wilentz arguably put all of his affordable housing eggs in one 
“fair share” basket in Mount Laurel II, placating angry suburbs with 
the soothing thought that, once they achieved the numbers demanded 
by AMG Realty and, later, COAH, they would be off the hook and 
could freely enact “large-lot and open space zoning, that would 
maintain its beauty and communal character.”78  As Justice Skillman, 
one of the three original Mount Laurel judges, noted in upholding a 
township’s ten-acre minimum lot size, “under Mount Laurel II, once a 
municipality discharges its obligations regarding housing for low and 
moderate-income households . . . it has no constitutional obligation to 
provide through zoning for a variety of other forms of housing.”79  On 
this reading, Mount Laurel purchases political support for the “fair 
share” obligation by foregoing other more libertarian attacks on 
exclusionary zoning.  This political calculation may have been 
sensible: striking down excessively restricting zoning even after a 
municipality ponied up their bureaucratically specified “fair share” of 
affordable housing would likely be perceived as piling on.  Given the 
inaccuracy of the “fair shares” thus defined, however, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court may have bet its political capital on the wrong horse. 
What about the relative political merits of the unit- and restriction-
based theories?  That is a much closer case: homeowners will 
 
 78. S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390, 390 (N.J. 1983). 
 79. New Jersey Farm Bureau v. Twp. of East Amwell, 882 A.2d 388, 394 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005). 
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certainly object to minimum residential densities.  The experience in 
both Oregon and New Jersey suggests that such opposition can be 
fierce and successful.80  There are, however, two reasons for believing 
that density minimums may avoid some of the most intense aversion 
to Mount Laurel. 
First, in addition to the usual opposition that any new construction 
might inspire among homeowners, “fair shares” of affordable housing 
also attract the residual opposition to the fiscal collective action 
problem described in Part I above that is especially salient when 
prospective residents require more expensive services or live in less 
expensive structures.  Worries about “tipping” from one racial or 
socio-economic group to another are exacerbated to the extent that 
housing is reserved for lower-income groups.  Precisely because 
Mount Laurel focuses its attention on low- and moderate-income 
housing, the doctrine would seem to be more prone to trigger these 
fears more directly than a mere density minimum.  As the late 
Professor Payne argued, the theory requires recognition of a 
“constitutional right to shelter and the governmental obligation to 
meet the housing need to the maximum practicable extent . . . .”81  
Such a right to shelter, however, faces the obstacle of stable public 
opinion: while public opinion regarding welfare rights shifts over time 
and in response to elite and media influence,82 there is plentiful 
evidence that Americans consistently favor rights to minimum levels 
 
 80. In 2002, an organization called “Oregonians In Action” placed a ballot 
initiative on the state-wide ballot to overturn the state Land Conservation & 
Development Commission’s Metropolitan Housing Rule requiring minimum 
residential densities within urban growth boundaries.  The measure was defeated 
only after supporters of the rule placed an alternative measure purporting to curb 
density increases. See  ANTHONY FLINT, THIS LAND: THE BATTLE OVER SPRAWL AND 
THE FUTURE OF AMERICA 202–03 (2006); Nancy Chapman & Hollie Lund, Housing 
Density and Livability in Portland, in THE PORTLAND EDGE: CHALLENGES AND 
SUCCESSES IN GROWING COMMUNITIES 206, 213–14 (Connie P. Ozawa ed., 2004).  In 
New Jersey, a proposal to require minimum residential densities died in the state 
legislature in part because of opposition from South New Jersey representatives from 
low-density counties who objected to the obligation to increase densities when their 
housing was more affordable than denser jurisdictions in Northern New Jersey.  To 
view the withdrawn proposal, see S.B. 1, 214th Leg. (N.J. 2010), available at  
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2010/Bills/S0500/1_R3.pdf.  For further discussion of this 
topic, see Adam Gordon, The South Jersey S-1 Controversy, BLUE JERSEY (June 18, 
2010), http://www.bluejersey.com/diary/15923/the-south-jersey-s1-controversy. 
 81. Payne, Reconstructing, supra note 2, at 576. 
 82. For an account of how elite and media opinion likely altered public support 
for welfare rights during the 1990s, see Saundra K. Schneider & William G. Jacoby, 
Elite Discourse and American Public Opinion: The Case of Welfare Spending, 58 
POL. RES. Q. 367 (2005). 
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of welfare only when these rights are conditioned on the recipients’ 
making good-faith efforts to obtain employment and achieve financial 
independence, and they support constraints such as time limits on 
those rights as ways to insure that the right-holders meet these 
conditions.83 
Unsurprisingly, in light of public hostility towards unconditional 
welfare rights, Mount Laurel II defends a right to shelter that dare 
not speak its name: Mount Laurel II self-consciously backs away from 
any explicit defense of a right to shelter in favor of language calling 
for a realistic “opportunity” for shelter.84  Mount Laurel II is reticent 
not only in rhetoric but also in remedy: Mount Laurel II does not 
require municipalities to raise revenue for affordable housing through 
ordinary property taxation, even though such taxation would seem to 
be “practicable.”85  Instead, Mount Laurel II compels only those 
financing mechanisms that export burdens to non-residents or locally 
weak owners of vacant land, such as inclusionary zoning or applying 
for federal and state grants.  According to Professor Payne, these 
limits are the result of the justices’ recognition that “enforcement of a 
broadly-stated constitutional right to shelter . . . would be well beyond 
the practical capacity of the judicial system.”86  But the phrase 
“practical capacity of the judicial system” here appears to be a 
euphemism for “political acceptability of the entitlement.”  This 
tension between the rhetoric and the right undermines the legitimacy 
of Mount Laurel.  Indeed, to the extent that Mount Laurel is 
explicitly framed as a constitutional right of the poor to a minimum 
level of welfare, the doctrine triggers negative beliefs and stereotypes 
that fuel opposition to affordable housing, such as the belief that the 
 
 83. For evidence from public opinion surveys regarding American attitudes 
towards welfare rights, see STEVE FARKAS ET AL., THE VALUES WE LIVE BY: WHAT 
AMERICANS WANT FROM WELFARE REFORM 16–20, 44–46 (1996); MARTIN GILENS, 
WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE: RACE, MEDIA, AND THE POLITICS OF 
ANTIPOVERTY PROGRAMS 2–8 (Susan Herbst & Benjamin Page eds., 1999). 
 84. See S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Mount Laurel Twp., 456 A.2d 390, 465 
(N.J. 1983). 
 85. Southern Burlington discusses the required “affirmative measures.” Id. at 
443–45, 456.  While applying for available state and federal subsidies is among these 
required measures, raising taxes to finance affordable housing is not. 
 86. Payne, supra note 2, at 567. 
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poor “do not have a strong work ethic and prefer public assistance 
over self-sufficiency.”87 
By contrast, while minimum densities will certainly trigger the 
usual NIMBY reaction to changes in the housing status quo, such 
densities do not carry the extra baggage of welfare rights.  The right 
to be free from excessive regulation has been championed by opinion 
leaders on the Right: Jack Kemp, President George Bush’s Secretary 
of Housing & Urban Development, embraced the goal of breaking 
down regulatory barriers to affordable housing.88  To be clear, New 
Jersey homeowners are not likely to be swayed by abstract 
considerations of ideology.  But Republican leaders are more likely to 
be swayed by considerations of abstract ideology than the rank and 
file.  By styling the right to be free from exclusionary zoning as a right 
that applies to all housing types and not only income-constrained 
housing, the anti-restriction theory also casts the housing question “as 
an issue affecting all Americans” rather than an issue of importance 
only to the poor, thereby avoiding stigmatizing stereotypes that 
inflame homeowner opinion against affordable housing.89 
There is a second structural reason why minimum densities might 
be politically easier to implement than “fair shares” of actual units.  
“Fair shares” require identification of specific “Mount Laurel units” 
that must be built or rehabilitated in order to satisfy a municipal 
obligation.  By contrast, the minimum density does not require 
specific developments to be proposed and sited.  It requires only that 
zoning be relaxed, a process that can occur through relatively diffuse 
text amendments, such as adding apartments to industrial or 
commercial zones or by changing the definitions of permissible 
residential uses.  Oregon’s experience provides anecdotal evidence 
that such purely regulatory change, unconnected to specific ground-
breakings, can be smuggled past neighborhood opposition for 
extended periods of time.  The Metropolitan Housing Rule only 
 
 87. Mai Thi Nguyen et al., Opposition to Affordable Housing in the USA: Debate 
Framing and the Responses of Local Actors, 30 HOUSING THEORY & SOC’Y 107, 122 
(2012). 
 88. See Jack Kemp, Mandate to the Commission, in ADVISORY COMM’N ON 
REGULATORY BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE HOUS., “NOT IN MY BACK YARD”: 
REMOVING BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING (1991), available at 
http://www.huduser.org/publications/pdf/NotInMyBackyard.pdf. 
 89. Nguyen et al., supra note 87, at 112. 
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generated serious neighborhood opposition in the mid-1990s, a 
decade after it was promulgated.90 
The claim that a density-based strategy will confront less political 
opposition than the unit-based strategy, however, must be taken as a 
hypothesis and not a proven fact.  Incumbent landowners have strong 
economic incentives to defend restrictive zoning to protect their 
home values regardless of whether proposed housing is income-
restricted.91  Professor Payne is surely correct to note that an all-out 
assault on zoning would likely fail, because “land use controls have 
substantial social value in their own right” and are “not about to 
wither away anytime soon in the modern state.”92  Any attack on 
zoning restrictiveness, therefore, is politically feasible only if it is 
temperate and limited, attacking only those restrictions that are the 
product of the sorts of collective action problems described in Part I.  
The anti-restriction theory outlined here attempts to meet these 
requirements by giving municipalities broad latitude to apportion 
their “zoning budget” across parcels as they please, by making the 
ceiling on restrictiveness a rebuttable presumption, and by defining 
the ceiling in terms of the state-wide mix of housing types. 
C. Implementing a Ceiling on Zoning Restrictiveness 
Through Filtering Credits 
What legal basis could there be for imposing such a presumptive 
ceiling on municipal zoning power?  Ordinary constitutional theories 
of substantive due process and statutory ultra vires theories have 
limited value, because they generally require proof that a 
municipality has singled out a neighborhood or landowner for 
distinctively unfavorable treatment.  Bailes v. Township of East 
Brunswick93 illustrates this prohibition on “singling out.”  In Bailes, 
the plaintiffs challenged a special “rural preservation zone” that had 
been imposed on mostly undeveloped lots in particular areas of the 
township and that limited the development of such lots of six acres for 
every residential dwelling unit while leaving place higher density 
 
 90. On the growth of neighborhood opposition in the mid-1990s over the planning 
of Southwest Portland, see Bradshaw Hovey, Making the Portland Way of Planning: 
The Structural Power of Language, 2 J. PLANNING HIST. 140, 147–57 (2003). 
 91. For the classic discussion of these incentives, see FISCHEL, supra note 23.  For 
recent empirical confirmation, see Hilber & Robert-Nicoud, supra note 54. 
 92. See Payne, supra note 2, at 574. 
 93. Bailes v. Twp. of E. Brunswick, 882 A.2d 395 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005). 
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zoning for the balance of the township’s residents.  In holding that the 
zoning violated New Jersey’s Municipal Land Use law,94 Justice 
Skillman relied heavily on the State Planning Commission’s “equity 
policy,” because “[m]ost of East Brunswick, including substantial 
parts of the RP zone, has been developed with residences on small 
lots,” while “[p]laintiffs are a relatively small group of landowners 
who have continued to farm and conduct other low-intensity uses of 
their properties.”95 
Focusing on the “singling out” of landowners by their neighbors is 
useless against even-handed zoning that imposes low-density 
restrictions on all or most residential uses within a jurisdiction.  Such 
laws do not involve intra-municipal exploitation of landowners by 
their neighbors, but rather inter-municipal collective action problems.  
Their flaw is not that they single out landowners within a municipality 
for unfavorable treatment compared to the landowner’s neighbors 
but rather that they inefficiently restrict residential uses beneath 
levels that everyone would prefer if only they could coordinate their 
zoning laws.  To deal with such even-handed laws one needs a 
doctrine similar to Mount Laurel in its focus on limiting the exclusion 
of residential uses. 
The state legislature of any state, of course, could authorize a 
restriction-based strategy against exclusionary zoning similar to that 
outlined here.  Indeed, one legislature has already done so: The 
Oregon state legislature has adopted planning statutes authorizing the 
Oregon Land Conservation & Development Commission (LCDC) to 
adopt land-use planning “goals,”96 and, pursuant to this mandate, the 
LCDC has adopted Goal 10 on Housing, requiring local plans to 
“encourage the availability of adequate numbers of needed housing 
units at price ranges and rent levels which are commensurate with the 
financial capabilities of Oregon households and allow for flexibility of 
housing location, type and density.”97  Unlike Mount Laurel, Goal 10 
is not focused exclusively on protecting the supply of housing 
affordable by low- and moderate-income groups but instead requires 
 
 94. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-62(a) (West 2008)(“The zoning ordinance shall be 
drawn with reasonable consideration to the character of each district and its peculiar 
suitability for particular uses and to encourage the most appropriate use of land.”). 
 95. Bailes, 882 A.2d at 409. 
 96. See OREGON REV. STAT. ANN. § 197.040(2)(a) (West 2009) (“Pursuant to 
ORS chapters 195, 196 and 197, the commission shall: (a) Adopt, amend and revise 
goals consistent with regional, county and city concerns . . . .”). 
 97. OR. ADMIN. R. 660-015-0000(10) (2013), available at http://www.oregon.gov/ 
LCD/docs/goals/goal10.pdf. 
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that municipalities accommodate all housing types at every income 
level.  Accordingly, the LCDC has construed Goal 10 in its 
“Metropolitan Housing Rule” to require municipal zoning to 
accommodate minimum levels of residential density such that smaller 
cities must provide for an overall density of at least six units per acre, 
medium-sized cities provide for at least eight units per acre, and that 
the larger urbanized areas provide for at least ten units per acre.98 
Unfortunately, Oregon’s system is also accompanied by aggressive 
enforcement of urban growth boundaries that reduce the supply of 
buildable land in suburban and rural areas.99  Those boundaries were 
the quid pro quo by which advocates of “smart growth” in Oregon 
persuaded environmentalists to support higher urban densities.100  As 
a result, Oregon’s experience with increased densities is difficult to 
compare to New Jersey’s experience with fair share.  The evidence 
suggests that Oregon’s system of smart growth performed worse than 
New Jersey’s unit-based system in controlling housing costs,101 
perhaps because the effects of urban growth boundaries cancelled out 
the effects of higher densities.  On the other hand, the LCDC’s rules 
do not seem to have inspired the political resentment of COAH’s 
rules, and unlike COAH, the LCDC enforces Goal 10 aggressively, 
rejecting fifty-two of fifty-three plans submitted by cities with 
populations over 5000 for failing to comply with Goal 10.102 
 
 98. OR. ADMIN. R. 660–007-0035 (West, Westlaw through Oregon Bulletin dated 
July 1, 2013). 
 99. For an overview of Oregon’s system of urban growth boundaries and 
mandated densities, see Edward J. Sullivan, The Quiet Revolution Goes West: The 
Oregon Planning Program 1961–2011, 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 357 (2012). 
 100. For a description of the alliance between environmentalists and developers 
that created the urban growth boundaries in Oregon, see PETER A. WALKER & 
PATRICK T. HURLEY, PLANNING PARADISE: POLITICS AND VISIONING OF LAND USE IN 
OREGON 43–75, 114–18 (2011).  For a general history of Oregon’s experience with the 
urban growth boundaries, see PLANNING THE OREGON WAY: A TWENTY-YEAR 
EVALUATION (Carl Abbott, et al. eds., 1994). 
 101. Oregon had a larger share of cost-burdened renter households than New 
Jersey and added fewer rental units than New Jersey. GREGORY K. INGRAM ET AL., 
SMART GROWTH POLICIES: AN EVALUATION OF PROGRAMS AND OUTCOMES 78–79 
(2009), available at http://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/Smart-Growth-Policies-Ch-6-
Affordable-Housing.pdf. 
 102. GERRIT KNAAP & ARTHUR C. NELSON, THE REGULATED LANDSCAPE: 
LESSONS ON STATE LAND USE PLANNING FROM OREGON 80 (1992).  The LCDC has 
often used aggressive rhetoric in defense of its state housing goals. See, e.g., Seaman 
v. City of Durham, Or. LCDC, No. 77-0925 (1978) (“Goal 10 speaks of the housing 
needs of Oregon households, not the housing needs of Durham’s households.  Its 
meaning is clear: planning for housing must not be parochial.  Planning jurisdictions 
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Short of the New Jersey legislature’s improbably adopting a density 
mandate similar to Oregon’s, is there anything that the New Jersey 
courts or COAH could do to introduce a limit on the restrictiveness 
of zoning laws within the framework set out by Mount Laurel and the 
New Jersey Fair Housing Act?  One possibility is to give “fair share” 
credit to local governments who adopt higher overall residential 
densities and promote multifamily housing, even when such housing 
is not deed-restricted regarding the amounts for which it can be sold 
or rented.  The theory behind such credits is that new market-rate 
housing would indirectly result in affordable units through downward 
filtering. 
Unfortunately, COAH has given filtering a bad name among 
advocates of affordable housing.103  The New Jersey Appellate 
Division has lent its authority to their criticisms of COAH by 
invalidating COAH’s use of filtering calculations to reduce estimates 
of total regional housing need.  COAH assumed that some sound 
housing units would become less expensive over time as they aged, 
eventually becoming affordable to low- and moderate-income 
households, allegedly resulting in 59,156 sound housing units 
becoming affordable to low- or moderate-income households 
between 1999 and 2014.104  Based on this estimate, COAH subtracted 
59,156 units from the overall statewide projected need of 140,365 
units.  The appellate division rejected this theory by noting that 
COAH produced no “data that would demonstrate whether, in 2004 
or 2006, there exists an overall housing surplus in New Jersey, that 
more houses are being built than households being formed, and that 
housing with moderate operating costs is now being constructed.”105  
In effect, COAH simply assumed that the supply market-rate housing 
was somehow growing faster that housing need, creating automatic 
filtering, without any proof that any municipality actually loosened up 
the regulation of market-rate housing. 
It would be unfortunate if COAH’s dishonest abuse of the filtering 
concept led to its abandonment by the friends of Mount Laurel.  If 
 
must consider the needs of the relevant region in arriving at a fair allocation of 
housing types. . . .”), quoted in ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE 
CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS 785 (3d ed. 2005) 
 103. Alan Mallach, The Betrayal of Mount Laurel: Will New Jersey Get Away 
with Gutting its Landmark Fair Housing Legislation?, SHELTERFORCE ONLINE 
(March-April 2004), available at http://www.shelterforce.com/online/issues/134/ 
mtlaurel.html. 
 104. N.J. ADMIN. CODE. § 5:94, app. a, tbl.10, at 94-42 (2011). 
 105. In re Adoption of 5:94 & 5:95, supra note 5, at 371. 
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deployed with integrity, filtering credits could provide an important 
incentive for municipalities to deregulate their housing markets.  The 
critical problem with COAH’s use of filtering was that COAH 
required nothing in return from municipalities in return for the 
filtering reduction: the reduction was not a carrot but a gift.  The 
proper use of filtering would create an incentive for municipalities to 
reduce regulation of market-rate housing by reducing the “fair share” 
obligation only for those municipalities that amend their zoning laws 
to meet state standards for minimum percentages of multifamily 
housing and gross residential density.  Those standards should be 
stringent and data-driven.  In return for any filtering credit, the state 
ought to insist on zoned gross densities far higher than the one-acre 
lot minimums that prevail in suburban New Jersey, and the state 
should provide data that a such deregulation actually reduces housing 
costs to the point where the bottom tier of existing housing will likely 
filter down to low- and moderate-income households. 
Such a use of filtering credits will prove controversial among 
friends of Mount Laurel, because these credits reduce the obligation 
to encourage the production of income-restricted units that Mount 
Laurel’s advocates regard as the doctrine’s central purpose.  But such 
units are fragile benefits—beneficial to the lucky few who receive 
them, but useless to the majority of New Jersey’s low- and moderate-
income households who will inevitably be housed in filtered 
structures.  New Jersey’s median family income was $65,370 in 1999; 
according to the 2000 Census, there were well over 300,000 families 
making less than fifty percent of this income.106  By contrast, Mount 
Laurel has been estimated to have made available only 60,731 
affordable units,107 leaving much more than eighty percent of New 
Jersey’s poor dependent on housing made available through means 
other than Mount Laurel’s unit-based strategy. 
Given these disparities, it may be worthwhile to sacrifice some of 
those Mount Laurel units if such sacrifice will yield a substantial 
deregulation of market-rate units.  The informational burdens and 
political turmoil from which Mount Laurel has suffered over its 
 
 106. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, NEW JERSEY: 2000, at 4 (2002) available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/c2kprof00-nj.pdf. 
 107. Mount Laurel is estimated to have made available 60,731 affordable units 
between 1980 and 2000. See STUART MECK ET AL., REGIONAL APPROACHES TO 
AFFORDABLE HOUSING 39 (2003). 
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thirty-year history suggest, at least, that it might be worth giving an 
anti-restriction based strategy a try. 
